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NOTES
AGENCY - SELLING BROKERS ARE SUBAGENTS OF SELLERS IN
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING MULTIPLE LISTING
SERVICES. Fennell v. Ross, 289 Ark. 374, 711 S.W.2d 793 (1986)
The Fennells sought the services of Rainey Realty Co. in locating
property where they could reside and Dr. Fennell could carry on his
veterinary practice. One of Rainey's real estate agents, Mrs. White-
man, noticed a promising listing in a multiple listing service (MLS)
publication. The Rosses had listed the property through Century 21
Reddick Company; the listing advertised the property's "Commercial
Potential! Any type business!" Mrs. Whiteman showed the property to
the Fennells, assuring them that they would have no trouble having it
rezoned from a residential to a commercial classification. The Fennells
and the Rosses then executed an offer and acceptance. Shortly thereaf-
ter the Fennells learned that rezoning would be difficult to accomplish
since the property was located in a flood plain. The Fennells refused
further performance under the contract.
The Rosses brought an action against the Fennells for breach of
contract. The Fennells answered that they had properly rescinded the
contract and counterclaimed seeking restitution of the earnest money
they had paid. They argued that the Rosses had misrepresented the
property by advertising its "Commercial Potential!" in the MLS
publication.
The Pulaski County Circuit Court awarded the Rosses damages.
The court found that Mrs. Whiteman knew, or should have known, of
the flooding problem, and that Mrs. Whiteman (and consequently her
employer, Rainey Realty Co.) was the Fennells' agent. Thus, the court
charged the Fennells with constructive knowledge of the flooding prob-
lem, and would not allow rescission on grounds of misrepresentation.
The court reasoned that this constructive knowledge negated the Fen-
nells' claim of reliance on the misrepresentation.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, re-
versed the trial court's decision. The court agreed that the crucial ques-
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tion was whether Mrs. Whiteman (and consequently Rainey Realty
Co.) was the agent of the buyers or the sellers. The supreme court held,
as a matter of law, that in an MLS transaction such as this, the selling
agent1 is a subagent of the seller. The court remanded the case for the
trial court to apply this law to the facts before it. Fennell v. Ross, 289
Ark. 374, 711 S.W.2d 793 (1986).
The Arkansas Supreme Court has defined agency as the relation-
ship resulting from the conduct of "two parties manifesting that one of
them is willing for the other to act for him subject to his control, and
that the other consents so to act.' The party for whom action is to be
taken is the principal, and the party who is to act is the agent.' "The
principal must in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for him,
and the agent must act or agree to act on the principal's behalf and
subject to his control."4 The two essential elements of this definition are
authorization and control.5 Generally, the existence of an agency rela-
tionship is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder; but
where the facts are undisputed, and only one inference can be drawn
from them, the existence of agency becomes a question of law.
Another actor often found in the agency relationship is the sub-
agent.7 A subagent is one for whose conduct the appointing agent is
responsible to the principal, and possibly to persons with whom the sub-
agent deals.8 However, the term "subagent" has also been applied to
persons who are to act for the principal, and who may be more properly
characterized as an agent of the principal, despite being appointed by
another agent.'
In some transactions involving two or more principals, it may be
difficult to determine which principal a particular agent is representing.
When it is unclear which of two contracting principals the agent repre-
1. The selling agent, also known as the selling broker, is generally the broker who obtains the
purchase offer from the buyer. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
2. Evans v. White, 284 Ark. 376, 378, 682 S.W.2d 733, 734 (1985); Crouch v. Twin City
Transit. Inc., 245 Ark. 778, 780, 434 S.W.2d 816, 817-18 (1968).
3. Evans, 284 Ark. at 378, 682 S.W.2d at 734; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1
(1957).
4. Evans, 284 Ark. at 378. 682 S.W.2d at 734.
5. Id.
6. Id.; Campbell v. Bastian, 236 Ark. 205, 208-09, 365 S.W.2d 249, 251 (1963).
7. See Demian, Ltd. v. Charles A. Frank Assocs., 671 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1982); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5 (1957).
8. Demian, Ltd., 671 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5
comment b (1957).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5 comment b (1957); see also F. MECHEM, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF AGENCY § 332 (2d ed. 1914 & photo. reprint 1982).
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sents, the court should ascertain the factual relationship of the parties
to determine which principal the agent is serving in the transaction. 10
Thus, the question of who the agent represents in the transaction be-
comes a question of fact.1
Once a party manifests its assent to act as an agent, that agent is
a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.'
2
Thus, the agent has a duty to act solely for the benefit of the principal
in matters connected with his agency.' 3 For example, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has held that an agent cannot represent both parties to a
transaction without their full knowledge and consent.1 '
The Arkansas Supreme Court held in Morrison v. Bland"1 that a
broker is one type of agent.' "A broker is one who is engaged for
others, [for] a commission, to negotiate contracts relative to property
... .,,The broker has no concern with the custody of this property.
There are many kinds of brokers, who are known by the particular
class of transactions in which they are engaged, such as stock brokers,
insurance brokers, business brokers, and real estate brokers.' 8 A broker
who begins a transaction as the agent of one party often may become
the agent of both parties or of the other party at some time during the
transaction." At least one court, however, has held that a broker is the
agent of the party who first employs him.2 Since a broker is an
agent,21 the question of whose agent the broker is could be answered as
10. F. Mechem, supra note 9, § 300. See also Walker v. Huckabee, 10 Ark. App. 165, 661
S.W.2d 460 (1983); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 comment b (1957).
11. F. MECHEM, supra note 9, § 300. Mechem suggests the following inquiries to determine
who the agent represents: Who set the agent in motion originally? Who gave the agent his instruc-
tions? Whose interests was the agent primarily to protect? Who was to pay the agent? Who could
hold the agent liable for the agent's negligence? Would holding an agent to be the agent of one
party leave the other without a representative in the transaction?
12. B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. Boggs, 439 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957).
13. 439 F Supp. at 738; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957).
14. Ellsworth v. Benedict, 214 Ark. 367, 374, 216 S.W.2d 392, 395 (1949); City Nat'l Bank
v. McCann, 193 Ark. 967, 988, 106 S.W.2d 195, 206 (1937); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 13 comment a (1957).
15. 226 Ark. 514, 291 S.W.2d 243 (1956).
16. Id. at 519, 291 S.W.2d at 246.
17. Frier v. Terry, 230 Ark. 302, 307, 323 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1959).
18. Id. at 308, 323 S.W.2d at 419; F. MECHEM, supra note 9, § 73. Arkansas defines a real
estate broker as someone, other than a salesman, who for another, and for compensation, handles
a variety of given commercial transactions relative to real property. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1302
(1979).
19. F. MECHEM, supra note 9, § 300.
20. Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 475 (Iowa 1985); F. MECHEM, supra note 9, § 73.
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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it is for any other agent-by an examination of the facts to see if an
agency relationship exists,2 2 and, if so, which party plays which role.23
Real estate brokerage originated in the land marketing practices
of the nineteenth century.24 Specialists in real estate brokerage ap-
peared during the last half of the nineteenth century, closely followed
by real estate firms.25 These firms gained additional support when state
licensure laws appeared just after the First World War.2  The early
real estate brokers also created "real estate exchanges," modeled on
stock exchanges, to help with their local transactions.27 "By the 1920s,
[real estate exchanges] had evolved into what are now known as Multi-
ple Listing Services."
2 8
A Multiple Listing Service (MLS) has been defined "as an ar-
rangement between a number of real-estate brokers in a given [geo-
graphical] area whereby any member broker is authorized to sell prop-
erty exclusively listed with any other member broker."2 Initially, a
broker will procure an exclusive right-to-sell listing contract with the
seller.30 This contract generally authorizes the broker to submit the list-
ing to the MLS." If the listing is submitted to an MLS, any other
broker who is a member of the MLS is authorized to sell the prop-
erty.32 When a sale of a listed property is consummated, the fee is usu-
ally split among the selling broker, the listing broker, and the MLS
administrative office.33 Listing property with an MLS is intended to
broaden the market exposure for each property listed, theoretically re-
sulting in a higher price and a quicker sale."
One of the legal problems raised by MLS operations is that of
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. D. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § I.I, at 1 (1982).
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. § 1.4, at 7.
28. Id.
29. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 527, 429 P.2d 864, 868 (1967).
30. D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5.
31. Id. The relevant language in a form "Real Estate Contract (Exclusive Right to Sell)," on
file with the office of the Arkansas Realtors Association in Little Rock at the time this Note was
written, states in Paragraph 12:
"12. OTHER AUTHORIZATION: Unless otherwise specified, Owner authorizes
the following: . . . (c) Offering of the property in multi-list or co-op
brokerage."
32. D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5.
33. Frisell, 71 Wash. 2d at 527, 429 P.2d at 868; see also D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5 at
14.
34. D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.4; see also Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple List-
ing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1970).
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assigning agency roles to the brokers involved in order to ascertain
their legal duties.3 5 As noted above, one broker will secure a listing
contract with the seller;"6 this broker is thus known as the "listing bro-
ker," and he is deemed to be the agent of the seller by virtue of the
listing contract and the relationship it evidences.3 " The second broker
in the MLS transaction is known as the "selling broker," since he is the
broker who obtains the offer to purchase from the buyer.3 This "selling
broker" causes problems for courts. An issue often raised in real estate
transactions involving an MLS arrangement, where the listing broker
has listed the property at the seller's direction and the selling broker
has worked with the buyer to locate and show the property, is this: for
which party is the selling broker an agent? "
The resolution of this issue can be significant. One line of reason-
ing holds the selling broker to be the subagent of the seller. 0 The list-
ing broker, who is the seller's agent by virtue of the listing contract,
costructively "appoints" the selling broker as a subagent when the list-
ing broker submits the listing to the MLS and the selling broker finds a
buyer.4 If the selling broker is a subagent of the seller, the the selling
broker owes his primary duties to the seller. 2 Thus, the buyer would
have no representation in the transaction, and would be left to the ef-
fects of caveat emptor." The buyer would retain his remedies of rescis-
sion and restitution-the seller would become liable for any misrepre-
sentation of his subagent by virtue of the "ratifiction doctrine,"" So
that the buyer could rescind on the basis of misrepresentation.45
On the other hand, the selling broker could be found to be the
buyer's agent, depending on the facts of the transaction." If the selling
broker is the agent of the buyer, then the buyer would lose his remedies
35. E.g., D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5; Note, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability;
Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 AIUz. L. REV. 767 (1978).
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. Note, supra note 25, at 771 n.22.
38. Id., n.23.
39. See Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash.
2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5.
40. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
41. See D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5.
42. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
43. Note, Real Estate Brokers' Duties to Prospective Purchasers. 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 513
(1976); See Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer Seller Relationship,
18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343 (1972).
44. Note, supra note 35, at 773 n.33.
45. Miller v. Boeger, I Ariz. App. 554, 405 P.2d 573 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 259 (1957); Note, supra note 35, at 773 n.33.
46. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
1986-87]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
of rescission and restitution for the selling broker's misrepresentations,
for two reasons. First, since the selling broker's knowledge would be
imputed to the buyer,47 the buyer would constructively know the facts
of the transaction and would not be justified in relying upon any mis-
representation. 8 Second, the buyer could not rescind against the seller
since the "ratification doctrine" would not be applicable-the selling
broker would not be the seller's subagent, so the seller could not ratify
his acts.' 9 Thus, the buyer's only recourse would be a suit against the
selling broker for damages resulting from the misrepresentation.5
A majority of decisions has found the selling broker to be the sub-
agent of the seller in MLS transactions;51 one leading case to that ef-
fect is Frisell v. Newman, 2 decided by the Washington Supreme
Court. In Frisell a seller sought to set aside a sale of property to a
partnership; one of the partners was a member of the selling broker's
firm, and had noticed the property when it was presented at an MLS
meeting by the listing broker. When the seller became dissatisfied with
the contract of sale, she sought to set aside the transaction on allega-
tions of breach of fiduciary duty by the partner/broker, whom the
seller claimed was her subagent by virtue of the MLS agreement.5 "
The court in Frisell examined the terms of the MLS agreement
itself to settle the issue." The court noted that the listing broker was
obligated by the listing contract to submit the listing to the MLS; then,
any MLS member had the right to sell the property.55 if an MLS
member sold the property, the seller had to pay a commission, which
would be divided among the listing broker, selling broker, and MLS
office; here, the selling broker was claiming the right to such a commis-
sion. 6 These facts led the court to hold that the selling broker was the
subagent of the seller in this MLS transaction, with corresponding fidu-
ciary duties that could not be circumvented by designations in the
MLS agreement itself.57 At least two subsequent Washington decisions
47. See M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 271 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1959); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 9(3) (1957).
48. See Gilbertson v. Clark, 175 Ark. 1118, 1 S.W.2d 823 (1928) (vendee cannot complain
of a misrepresentation if, before the sale of land, he knew the facts).
49. Note, supra note 35, at 773 n.33.
50. Id.
51. D. BURKE, supra note 24, §§ 1.5, 1.6.
52. 71 Wash. 2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967).
53. Id. at 522-25, 429 P.2d at 865-67.
54. Id. at 527-29, 429 P.2d at 868-69.
55. Id. at 528, 429 P.2d at 869.
56. Id. at 528-29, 429 P.2d at 869.
57. Id.
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have followed this holding as a matter of law.58 Other decisions within
the majority have assumed the selling broker to be the subagent of the
seller in MLS transactions with little or no discussion.' Most of the
scholarly writing on this issue supports the majority decisions in finding
the selling broker to be the subagent of the seller in MLS
transactions. o
A minority of jurisdictions have found no agency relationship be-
tween the selling broker and the seller (or between the selling broker
and the listing broker). 1 In Wise v. Dawson," the buyers brought an
action against the sellers, the listing broker, and the selling broker for
fraudulent misrepresentation. The listing broker moved for summary
judgment, arguing that a listing broker in an MLS transaction has no
liability for the selling broker's misrepresentations." The court in Wise
examined the MLS arrangement and found no "indicia of agency" es-
tablishing an agent-subagent relationship between the two brokers." It
noted that the local MLS defined itself as an "information exchange;"
that the MLS had no provision for control of the selling broker by the
listing broker, as is required in an agency relationship; and that the
splitting of the commission was no "indicia of agency," since indepen-
dent contractors split fees, too.6 ' The court held that there was no
agency relationship created by the MLS arrangement, and allowed the
listing broker's motion.66
Menzel v. Morse,'67 an Iowa Supreme Court decision, provides al-
ternate grounds for following the minority view. In Menzel, the selling
broker offered his services to the buyers, and found property for them
58. Pilling v. Eastern and Pac. Enters. Trust, 41 Wash. App. 158, 702 P.2d 1232 (1985);
First Church of the Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275, 574 P.2d
1211 (1978). The court in Pilling noted that "[i]n a multiple listing situation, the selling broker is
an authorized subagent of the listing broker (citation omitted). Thus, a selling agent in a multiple
listing system also owes the seller the same duties owed by the listing broker." Pilling. 41 Wash.
App. at 162, 702 P.2d at 1236.
59. See Marmis v. Solot Co., 117 Ariz. 499, 573 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (both
brokers owe an overriding duty to the seller to obtain the best price possible); Vanderschoot v.
Christiana, 10 A.D.2d 188, 198 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); Reich v. Christopulos, 123
Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238 (1953).
60. E.g., D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5; Note, supra note 35, at 771-73.
61. See e.g., Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) and Menzel v. Morse,
362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985).
62. 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
63. Id. at 208.
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 210. See also Pumphrey v. Quillen, 102 Ohio App. 173, 141 N.E.2d 675 (1955)
(examining the facts surrounding an MLS transaction to reach the same holding).
67. 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985).
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through the local MLS.6 8 When they subsequently became dissatisfied
with the house they had purchased, the buyers brought an action
against the selling broker for malpractice.6 9 The court in Menzel ad-
hered to the rule that a "real estate broker is the agent of the party
who first employs him or her, and this may be the buyer even though it
is anticipated the fee will be received from the seller." °70 The court
noted that the MLS arrangement meant only that the selling broker
would receive some commission from the listing broker.7 ' The court
found no agency relationship between the selling broker and the seller;
it held the selling broker liable to the buyers.2
In Fennell v. Ross,78 the Arkansas Supreme Court for the first
time faced the issue of the agency duties of the selling broker in an
MLS transaction. The court was convinced that the listing broker and
his salesman were agents of the seller, but was unsure of the status of
the selling broker and his employee, Mrs. Whiteman.74 The court re-
garded this question as one of law rather than fact.7  It quoted a dis-
cussion by a student writer as being "a good statement of the prob-
lem.17 6 This student writer concluded that the selling broker was the
subagent of the seller in MLS transactions, based upon the majority
decisions and upon the wording of a listing contract from the writer's
hometown.7 The writer conceded that the agency relationship created
was contrary to the buyer's expectations and beliefs, and unknown to
many selling brokers.7 8-
After noting that "[w]e have not previously decided this issue, and
there is a dearth of authority from other jurisdictions, '7 9 the court in
Fennell reviewed other relevant authorities it could find. The court
cited a California case in which the court found the selling broker a
subagent of the seller "in these circumstances." ' 0 The court determined
68. Id. at 467.
69. Id. at 467-69.
70. Id. at 475.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 289 Ark. 374, 711 S.W.2d 793 (1986).
74. Id. at 377-78, 711 S.W.2d at 795.
75. Id. at 377, 711 S.W.2d at 795.
76. Id. at 378-79, 711 S.W.2d at 795-96 (citing Note, supra note 35, at 771-73).
77. Note, supra note 35, at 771 nn. 25-26. The listing contract relied on specifically labeled
brokers other than the listing broker as subagents. Id. at 768-69 n.18. This contract should be
contrasted with the Arkansas Realtors Association listing contract cited supra note 31.
78. Fennell, 289 Ark. at 378, 711 S.W.2d at 796 (citing Note, supra note 35, at 772-73).
79. 289 Ark. at 379, 711 S.W.2d at 796.
80. Id. (citing Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956)). A reading of Kruse does not disclose the use of an MLS; rather, a broker who had a
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that most scholarly articles, including the one quoted, supported the
California court's holding.81 The court cited Wise v. Dawson, which
held that the selling broker was the buyer's agent, as an opinion to the
contrary, but did not otherwise discuss it.82 Finally, the court noted
criticism of one proposal to impose a dual fiduciary duty on the selling
broker.88
The court pointed out that an agent may only serve one principal
with respect to any one transaction." Stating that it agreed with the
authorities "who have reached the conclusion that in an MLS transac-
tion like this one the selling agent is a subagent of the sellers," the
court reversed the trial court's decision.88 The court offered no other
reasoning or policy considerations. Since the court had reversed the
trial court on a matter of law, the case was remanded for a new trial.86
Special Justice Brantley concurred in the result, but on different
grounds.87 Brantley argued that it was unnecessary to decide the
agency question, which, she noted, can arise in MLS transactions in
many different ways, resulting in complex problems."M Pointing out that
there had been a material misrepresentation of fact as to the location of
the property in a flood plain, Special Justice Brantley would have al-
lowed rescission under the rule that a contract may be rescinded if
there is a mutual mistake of a material fact.89 This would be possible
since the brokers had not detected the misrepresentation, but had made
a mutual mistake.9
Justice Hays dissented, expressing primary concern over the ma-
jority's treatment of the agency question. He thought it was a mistake
to treat the selling broker as a subagent of the seller as a matter of law,
since the existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact.91
Justice Hays believed that the selling broker was the buyers' agent on
"listing" on a house expressly requested the other broker to show the property.
81. Fennell, 289 Ark. at 379, 711 S.W.2d at 796 (citing D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.5;
Sinclair, The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property in
Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260, 263. 265 (1981)).
82. 289 Ark. at 379, 711 S.W. 2d at 796 (citing Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1975)).
83. 289 Ark. at 379, 711 S.W.2d at 796 (citing Note, supra note 35 at 773, n.33).
84. 289 Ark. at 379, 711 S.W.2d at 796.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 379-80, 711 S.W.2d at 796.
89. Id. at 380, 711 S.W.2d at 797.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 381, 711 S.W.2d at 797 (Hays, J., dissenting).
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these facts. He noted that Mrs. Whiteman had been utilized by the
buyers for more than a year, that both Mrs. Whiteman and Dr. Fennell
considered Mrs. Whiteman to be the Fennells' agent, and that Mrs.
Whiteman had signed the offer and acceptance as the buyers' agent.
Justice Hays predicted that the court would regret establishing its
holding as a rule of law in later cases.92
Fennell may represent a new exception to the method of determin-
ing agency relationships. Prior Arkansas law settled the question of
who an agent represented by examining the facts, where more than one
reasonable inference could be drawn.9" In MLS transactions, more than
one inference can generally be drawn. The selling broker may be paid
out of the commission received from the seller, and the listing contract
may specify that the selling broker is a subagent of the seller. But, the
buyer may contact the selling broker first; these two will then work
together, and both may intend and expect that the selling broker will
be the buyer's agent, working under his authorization and control. Fen-
nell cuts through these facts, and holds that, as a matter of law, the
selling broker is the seller's subagent in an MLS transaction. As Jus-
tice Hays pointed out, this holding is contrary to prior Arkansas law,
which usually has required an examination of the facts to determine if
an agency relationship was present."
An alternative approach, which Justice Hays endorsed, would be
to examine the given part of the transaction at issue to determine
whose agent the selling broker was."5 Thus, the selling broker could be
the buyer's agent for some purposes, and the seller's subagent for
others, depending on the particular part of the transaction being ex-
amined. Fennell forecloses this approach by holding that the selling
broker is the seller's subagent for all parts of the MLS transaction.
This new exception announced in Fennell rests on fragile ground.
The court cited one case in support of its decision," but it is distin-
guishable. Although in the cited case the court found a selling broker
to be the subagent of the seller, there is no mention of an MLS agree-
ment; rather, the listing broker had expressly requested the selling bro-
ker to show the property.97 As noted above, there are cases in the ma-
jority view that squarely discuss agency relationships in the context of
92. Id. at 382, 711 S.W.2d at 798.
93. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
94. 289 Ark. at 381, 711 S.W.2d at 797-98.
95. Id. at 382, 711 S.W.2d at 798.
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97. Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 6571 300 P.2d 855, 856 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956).
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an MLS on which the court in Fennell could have relied. In addition,
the court in Fennell failed to distinguish Wise, which also discussed
agency relationships in the context of an MLS but reached the opposite
result.
As a practical matter, the holding in Fennell means that buyers
may be left without adequate representation in real estate transactions.
Usually a buyer contacts a broker and asks for his help in locating a
home; the buyer and the broker spend quite a bit of time working to-
gether, and often both think that the broker is the buyer's agent."s
Under Fennell, this selling broker is now the seller's subagent, as a
matter of law, and may owe the buyer no duties in an MLS transac-
tion. Thus, a buyer may be forced to bring in a third broker, who has
no connection with the transaction, in order to have disinterested and
reliable representation. However, the buyer retains the remedies of re-
scission and restitution against the seller, while the seller is liable for
the misrepresentations of the selling broker.
This practical aspect of Fennell should have a broad impact on
residential real estate transactions in Arkansas. A recent nation-wide
government study" reported that approximately eighty-one percent of
all sellers of single-family residences use brokers. Ninety-two percent of
these sellers using brokers have their property listed on a local MLS.
Once listed on the MLS, fifty-three percent of the resulting sales in-
volve two brokers who are MLS members. Thus, Fennell will have a
significant impact on the parties to MLS real estate transactions such
as this in terms of their legal relationships and duties to each other.
D. Franklin Arey III
98. See Note, supra note 35, at 772; D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.6.
99. D. BURKE, supra note 24, § 1.4 (Supp. 1985) (citing FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Los
ANGELES REGIONAL OFFICE, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY, at 9, 28-29
(1983)).
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